Although the armed conflicts are largely over, the situation remains uncertain and it would be naïve to believe that the agreement will be easy to implement. Much will depend on how it is perceived by both opposing sides and its perception as a win-win solution. The agreement allows a Saudi military presence in the UAE`s areas of influence in southern coastal cities, in addition to the existing armed forces in Shabwa, Mahra and Hadhramawt. Saudi numbers began to rise after the events of August, under the pretext of respecting the ceasefire and preventing any further military escalation, and their units are and are still replacing their Emirati counterparts at military bases, at Aden airport and at coalition headquarters. This will only improve with Saudi oversight of the implementation of the agreement.7 Augustine does not, however, believe that the Riyadh agreement significantly alters the Saudi or Uae presence in the country. The primary objective of the agreement is to find common ground between the government and the TCC. The agreement provides for various procedures for the commissioning of state institutions, the most important of which are the most important: the agreement and its full or partial implementation should face challenges of a different nature: these provisions settle the first point of the agreement. These include a national unity government of 24 ministers divided equally between North and South and formed within 30 days of signing; Hadi will nominate the Prime Minister and appoint its members to representatives who are not involved in fighting or propaganda during the events of August 2019. The Prime Minister-designate will then appoint, in agreement, a governor and director of security for the governorate of Aden within 15 days, for Abyan and Dhalea within 30 days and for the other southern provinces within 60 days. The agreement was signed following the start of Saudi-led negotiations on 11 August 2019 following the STC`s initiative to drive hadi loyalists out of Aden and other southern regions. This section outlines the main points of the agreement.1 „STC`s promises to protect rights are a small step forward, but are far from sufficient given their record of serious abuses,“ Page said. „The STC, along with the Yemeni government and the Saudi-led coalition, now have an opportunity after the Riyadh agreement to rebuild trust with local residents and prioritize the protection of fundamental rights. You shouldn`t waste it.
The STC also achieved a major political victory in consolidating the military defeat it inflicted on government forces in the first round of confrontations in August 2019, and secured control of three provinces (Aden, Lahj and Dhalea). The STC is now a full partner in the Hadi government and is recognized by the agreement and its sponsors as the strongest of the political units in the South.